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Research grants: problems and options
BRIAN MARTIN
University of Wollongong
Introduction
Researchers often complain about research grant schemes,
but usually within a narrow frame of reference. Looking
more broadly, problems with grant schemes can be classi-
fied as bias, waste, discouragement and orientation to
interests. There are various ways to allocate research
funds, including administrative decision, peer review,
performance-based allocation, equality and community-
based bids. Each has different sorts of problems and serves
different interests. By looking at diverse systems for allocat-
ing research funds, some of the assumptions underlying
usual discussions become more apparent. Recent changes
in Australian government policy on higher education
research are examined using the framework provided
h e r e .
Any research grants scheme is likely to generate a great
deal of informal complaint. Not surprisingly, dissatisfac-
tion is most common among unsuccessful applicants, with
complaints about bias and wasted effort. Administrators
worry about making the system work efficiently. Reform-
ers seek methods of making better decisions, for example
by changing selection criteria and peer review systems,
and ensuring accountability.
However, most of the discussions about grant schemes
deal only with minor changes within the same basic
structure. Yet the structure of a scheme is often the primary
determinant of the sorts of problems that it generates. This
article aims to provide a broader perspective on this issue.
I start by outlining several key types of problems with
grant schemes and then lay out several types of methods
for decision making. With this foundation, it is straightfor-
ward to note the sorts of problems most commonly or
likely to be associated with decision-making systems.
Finally, recent changes in Australian government policy
on higher education research are assessed using the broad
framework offered here. (Some of the sources cited below
deal with peer review for journals, but their assessments
are likely to apply to peer review for grants as well.)
Problems
What constitutes a problem with a grant scheme, of
course, depends on the observer. Hence the focus needs
to be on perceived problems, acknowledging that wide-
spread perception of a problem may be a problem in itself,
whatever the ‘facts’. Here, several different types of
problem are outlined.
1. Bias
Among applicants, especially unsuccessful ones, allega-
tions of bias are commonplace. They include the follow-
ing.
• Success-breeds-success bias: successful applicants are
likely to become entrenched, using their grants to
produce the outputs necessary to attract further funds,
while others never have the chance to get started.
• Insider bias: decisions are made by cliques of insiders,
who think highly of, and award most grants to,
themselves and a small group of favourites.
• Dominant group bias: there is discrimination against
groups such as women, ethnic minorities and lower-
status institutions (Peters and Ceci, 1982; Wenneras
and Wold, 1997).
• Conventional approach bias: grants are much more
likely to support tried-and-true approaches, while
challenging, innovative or unorthodox proposals are
seldom funded (Armstrong, 1996, 1997; Epstein, 1990;
Horrobin 1990, 1996).
• Personal bias: administrators or referees obstruct re-
searchers or projects that they do not like (Horrobin,
1974).
To these possibilities can be added ‘random bias’ due to
incompetence of administrators or referees.
2. Waste
Any grant scheme requires administrative overheads to
assess applications. In addition, applicants may spend a
large amount of time preparing applications. Even in an
efficiently run operation, the cost associated with running
the scheme and preparing applications can be a significant
proportion of the money awarded in grants, especially if
the grants are small and the success rate is low. In addition,
not all grant schemes are run efficiently, aggravating the
problem of waste.
3. Discouragement
Most of the attention in grant schemes is on those who are
successful, but there can be significant effects on those
who are unsuccessful. They can be disheartened by
rejections or become resentful. This provides fertile soil for
beliefs that decisions are biased, which help to alleviate
the stigma of failure. Any competitive system creates this
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problem, whether it is grading in schools or promotion
systems at work. There is considerable evidence that
competition reduces intrinsic motivation (Kohn, 1993).
Even for more successful applicants, the goal of winning
a grant may become more significant than doing the
research.
4. Orientation to interests
The possibility of getting a grant provides an incentive to
do research that pleases those dispensing the money.
Grants provided by a corporation or government depart-
ment for research in particular fields—telecommunica-
tions or pesticides—obviously orient researchers to partic-
ular problems. This is not necessarily a problem in itself,
but can be seen to be one in the wider context of social
priorities. In short, research is oriented to those who have
money to dispense. Social problems which no one has a
vested interest in solving receive few resources (Arditti et
al., 1980; Dickson, 1984; Martin, 1979).
Many government grant schemes are oriented not to
problems but to acquisition of knowledge. Grants go to
applicants who best make the case that they are pushing
back the frontiers in astronomy or brain structure. Even in
these cases, it can be argued that there is an indirect
orientation to outside interests. For example, problems in
numerical analysis or oceanography may be influenced by
military priorities; problems in organic chemistry or elec-
trical engineering may be influenced by corporate prior-
ities. This influence can occur through paradigms, poten-
tial applications of pure research, or job prospects.
Finally, researchers have a vested interest in their own
careers, including positions and status. In as much as top
researchers are influential in making decisions about
grants, it is likely that the system of research—based on
full-time professional specialists—will be perpetuated.
This may be at the expense of other priorities, such as
pressing social problems. The familiar example of re-
searchers recommending further research is symptomatic
of the problem that the grant system is oriented to the
interests of researchers at the expense of others.
Methods
Researchers are so familiar with peer review—not least
through refereed journals—that it may seem that there is
no sensible alternative. But actually there are various
possibilities. The following are five possibilities, chosen
because they have the potential to deal effectively with
one or more of the problems noted above. They are
presented as ideal types. In practice, actual allocation of
research funds typically combines elements of several of
these methods.
Method A: administrative decision
In this ideal system, all decisions about research priorities
and funding are made by top administrators, who may or
may not be researchers themselves. In making their
decisions, the administrators take advice from a range of
groups: political and economic leaders, researchers, lob-
byists and so forth. The approach is typical of research in
large bureaucracies, especially government (in particular
the military) and corporations. The justification for this
approach is service to national, public or shareholder
interest, which are often taken as synonymous. The
research system emphasises co-operation and teamwork,
the exemplar being the Manhattan project for producing
the first nuclear weapons.
The patterns of research in the world today reflect high-
level administrative decisions. This applies not just to most
government and corporate research but also to much
university research, since administrators make most of the
decisions to decide the distribution of funds between
different fields, provide research infrastructure, and to set
up specific research centres and programs. For example,
the framework for deciding the allocation of research
funding between telecommunications engineering and
musicology within a university is normally decided by
managers, rather than by peer comparisons, equal distri-
bution or public opinion poll. There is, of course, no
objective method to decide such an allocation.
Researchers and other pressure groups do have some
influence on such administrative decisions. For example,
researchers and consumer groups have some influence on
the research agendas of electricity authorities and elec-
tronics firms. Although administrative decision is widely
used, it has received relatively little critical attention
compared to peer review; there are only a few researchers
who enthusiastically advocate it (McCutchen, 1977).
Method B: peer review
In this model, decisions about research priorities and
funding are made by peers, namely professional research-
ers knowledgeable in relevant areas, in a competitive
merit-based system. The justification for peer review is that
peers are best able to judge the merit of research and that
high-quality research is best able to advance knowledge
and serve the public interest.
Peer review can be implemented in various ways.
Applications can be sent to anonymous referees who rate
them. Alternatively, applications might all be judged by a
small panel without any outside comment. As long the
panel members are knowledgeable in the field, this is still
judgement by peers, though more open to accusations of
bias. Some key elements in peer review systems are:
• independence or otherwise of referees;
• anonymity of referees versus open peer review;
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• criteria for decision making;
• method of decision making.
There is a large literature on peer review, and much
discussion (Armstrong, 1997; Campanario, 1995; Chubin
and Hackett, 1990; Daniel, 1993; Peters and Ceci, 1982;
Wessely, 1998). However, for the purposes here, the
various options in peer review systems are secondary to
the main point that ranking of competing applications is
primarily based on judgements by peers.
After administrative decision, peer review plays a signif-
icant role in setting research priorities and making funding
decisions. This operates in grants schemes and in deci-
sions at the research project level within universities and,
to a lesser extent, in some government and corporate
research units. As noted above, administrative decisions
play a central role in setting the framework for many peer-
review decisions.
Method C: performance-based funding
This method funds researchers according to the outputs
that they have produced, such as publications and patents
(Forsdyke, 1993; Roy, 1984). By defining the desired sorts
of performance and defining the rewards, performance-
based funding can be implemented without formal grant
applications at all. For example, each paper in a specified
journal (perhaps weighted by the journal’s impact factor)
could result in a defined payment to the authors. The
research quantum allocated to Australian universities
relies on a formula including weights for publications,
research degree completions and funds received. This is
similar to Roy’s (1984) proposal for allocation of funds to
groups of researchers based on group productivity. Obvi-
ously, peer judgements influence funding via the outputs,
but performance-based funding differs from typical peer
review systems in being based strictly on outputs rather
than grant applications. One justification for performance-
based allocation is to avoid direct biases based on repu-
tation, gender or research findings.
Offering prizes for discoveries can be considered to be
another type of performance-based funding. Nobel prize
winners receive not only money but fame which often can
be translated into further resources.
Method D: equality
In this approach, every researcher gets either an equal
amount of funding or an equal chance at funding. Some
minimum requirements can be put on who is eligible, such
as all staff at a university or in a research group. Among
those who are eligible, available funding can be divided
up in any of several ways:
• Each year, available funds are equally divided be-
tween researchers.
• Researchers take turns receiving significant grants.
• Grants are awarded using a lottery.
A considerable proportion of research funds are
currently allocated using this method, at least nominal-
ly. If university staff are expected to devote one third of
their time to research, then one third of the budget for
salaries could be said to be allocated using the method
of rough equality (though since salaries are different,
the nominal allocation is not equal). For some human-
ities research, for example, time and access to good
libraries are the most crucial elements, and additional
research funding is less significant. On the other hand,
in many technical fields, salaries are only the beginning
of what is required to undertake research.
Method E: community-based allocation
In this model, research priorities and funding are
decided by a range of community groups, such as
groups of workers, parents or neighbours. The key
feature is that users at the grassroots would make the
decisions, rather than administrators or researchers.
Currently this approach is used for only a limited
amount of research, and therefore it is worthwhile
spelling out briefly how it might work.
 One procedure is to have a panel selected randomly
from volunteers from user groups. The panel would
hear submissions from researchers and other interested
groups and then make decisions about research prior-
ities and funding.
Another possible, and rather different, procedure is
for user groups to prepare submissions for research to
be carried out by particular researchers. The research-
ers, who would be expected to do a certain amount of
research selected from the user-group applications,
would choose which projects they preferred to under-
take. This is analogous to the way university depart-
ments are expected to provide a certain amount of
teaching selected from areas that students want to
study. The justification for community-based allocation
is to serve human needs.
So-called “science shops”—perhaps better described
as knowledge shops—are the closest thing to commu-
nity-based allocation. They take questions from com-
munity groups, trade unions, small businesses and
other organisations without significant resources for
research, help to turn the these questions into research-
able topics, and seek to find university students or staff
to carry out relevant projects (Farkas, 1999; Zaal and
Leydesdorff, 1987).
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Assessment
Although no allocation system is free of bias, waste,
discouragement or orientation to interest groups, the
expression of these problems can be quite different with
different systems. For example, community-based alloca-
tion provides incentives to do research serving quite
different interests than administrative decision. The choice
of an allocation system both reflects and shapes an
ongoing connection between researchers and interest
groups.
Most of the complaints commonly voiced about grant
schemes—such as bias in favour of insiders or against
innovators—concern more-or-less inevitable features of
competitive systems of allocation. The usual focus on the
problems with peer review and biases in grant schemes
draws attention away from both the realities of how
research priorities are set and the possibilities for greater
community participation in setting research agendas.
Broad research priorities are set primarily by administra-
tive decision. Concentrating on problems with peer re-
view systems diverts attention from this reality. Indeed,
peer review does not even provide the means for making
many of the central decisions affecting research, such as
decisions to set up institutions or departments or to
provide greater infrastructure or fund-
ing for certain faculties. This is be-
cause peer review mainly concerns
judgements within disciplines (peer
groups). The key research decisions,
by contrast, concern judgements be-
tween disciplines.
Concentrating on problems with
grants schemes as they currently exist
also diverts attention from the possi-
bility of greater participation by com-
munity groups and individuals in set-
ting priorities for research. There are
many ways in which such participa-
tion could be increased, such as by
community representatives on institu-
tional boards or advisory panels for
research groups, as well as being giv-
en a say over potential research projects
(Bammer et al., 1986). But most such
proposals are well and truly off the
agenda. The main contenders for in-
fluence are interest groups (especially
government and large corporations)
and researchers (especially elite re-
searchers).
Essentially, the perennial complaints
about grants schemes reflect the de-
pendent but privileged position of
most researchers. They benefit from
the allocation of substantial social re-
sources to their salaries and research projects. They are
reluctant to question the dominant institutions that control
their funding, or the framework in which it occurs. Few of
them believe that groups in the community—at least those
with little money—should have any direct say in research
priorities. That would be threatening to their prerogatives
and status, built up through peer systems.
The Australian research system
Recently, the Australian government has made major
policy changes affecting funding for higher education
research (DETYA, 1999). Although the changes are signif-
icant so far as Australian research policy goes, they are
relatively minor within the wider context outlined in this
article.
Administrative decision remains the dominant method
for setting research priorities and allocating funding for
much Australian research, including most corporate re-
search, both in-house and sponsored, as well as much in-
house government research. Within the university sector,
administrative decision is commonly used to decide on
major infrastructure projects and the relative staffing and
funding of different departments. Often these decisions
are mediated through formulas, themselves agreed to
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through administrative processes. None of this is greatly
affected by the government’s policy changes.
Academic staff are expected to do research and typically
are allocated a nominal proportion of their working week
to do so. This proportion can vary enormously, from full-
time for research-only positions to virtually zero for staff
overloaded with teaching or administration. Despite the
large inequalities in available research time, nevertheless
it is more equally distributed than research grants. It is
certainly the element of research support that most closely
fits the principle of equal allocation. In addition, full-time
research students, who carry out a substantial proportion
of research done in universities, typically spend most of
their time engaged in research, even more closely follow-
ing the principle of equal allocation. The government’s
policy changes do not explicitly address time available for
research, though there may be changes in time allocation
as an indirect effect.
Community-based allocation has never been a basis for
research funding in Australia. Australian science shop
initiatives have received little institutional support (Bam-
mer et al., 1992). There would be a few cases where
community groups, without research funds to disperse,
approach academics or students in order to get relevant
projects carried out. The government’s research policy is
entirely geared towards research oriented to groups that
can pay, especially large corporations and government
itself. The white paper makes no mention of community
input into research priorities.
Peer review is the method used by the Australian
Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) to decide allocation
of research grants. However, peer review operates only
within an overall framework—such as the relative alloca-
tions to engineering and humanities—that is decided
administratively. The white paper signals a change to peer
review procedures and their administration. Two ARC
innovations will be the appointment of program managers
to oversee the peer review system and the use of external
reviewers to rank grant applications, superseding the
former process of relying entirely on different independ-
ent external assessors for each application. These changes
may well have significant effects at the level of individuals
and groups applying for grants, but at a more general level
they can be seen to be a minor modification within the
peer review method of allocation.
Performance-based funding is used in Australia for
determining the ‘institutional grants’, a component of
research funding for universities that is allocated on a
competitive basis. (This role for performance-based fund-
ing is unusual in an international context.) The white
paper reports a change in the method of calculating this
funding: it is now to be 60% based on success in obtaining
research income, 30% on research student numbers and
10% on research output measured through publications.
This is a change in percentages from previously, espe-
cially in putting more emphasis on research student
numbers. However, performance-based funding is not
used at the level of grant applications, so the effect of
the policy changes on individual researchers, which
will be mediated through administrative decision-mak-
ing systems within universities, probably will be limit-
ed .
Thus, the government’s initiatives on research fund-
ing, while significant in relation to previous patterns,
are relatively minor within the wider context of possible
methods of allocating funds. Administrative decision
remains a dominant force, augmented by peer review
and institution-level performance-based allocation.
Equality as a method of allocation appears to have a
gradually declining role, while community-based allo-
cation remains totally marginal.
As for the problems associated with grant schemes,
little is likely to change. Problems of bias, waste and
discouragement will remain. More significantly, pres-
sures to orient research to dominant interests, especially
corporations and government, are increasing. Grant
schemes requiring alliances between university re-
searchers and ‘outside partners’—typically corpora-
tions or governments—have been increasingly impor-
tant in recent years. This increases the role of adminis-
trative decision, exercised by the outside partner, and
puts pressure on academics to link their research to
groups that have money and resources. Outside groups
without money are left out of the picture.
What does this picture imply in terms of recommen-
dations for change? The answer depends crucially on
one’s goals. If the goal is to serve the interests of large
corporations and governments—which are commonly
legitimated by equating them with the ‘national inter-
est’—then further expansion of grants requiring allianc-
es with ‘industry’ would be called for. If the goal is to
promote innovation (both technological and social)
then, arguably, tied money and peer review serve as
deterrents and a much better strategy is to provide
ample guaranteed funding for a substantial period
(Horrobin 1996), along the lines of the equality model.
If the goal is to help solve problems raised by those
without money and power—such as poor people,
communities under environmental assault and people
with disabilities—then a move toward community-
based allocation is the way to go.
How to move in any given direction is a big topic,
beyond the scope of this paper. The key point here is
that the design of grant systems involves a set of social
choices that have wide-reaching effects, yet most dis-
cussion about grants takes place within a narrow set of
assumptions, without mention of dramatically different
allocation principles and associated consequences.
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